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frontation, would the admission of the hearsay statements have been
harmless error? These questions remain unanswered by State v. Hansen.
Products Liability-REcoVERY OF ECONOMIC Loss IN COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS--Supewood Corp. v. Siempe/kamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159
(Minn. 1981).
The doctrine of products liability was developed primarily to compen-
sate consumers for personal injury and property damage caused by defec-
tive products.I Most importantly, the doctrine protects non-commercial
buyers who cannot adequately protect themselves against defective prod-
ucts. 2 Consumers can recover under warranty, negligence, 3 or strict lia-
bility theories4 for personal injury and property damage.5
Courts have not received claims for economic loss damages in commer-
cial transactions as readily as they have received consumer claims. A
majority of the states6 that have considered the issue follow Seell v. White
Motor Co., 7 and disallow recovery of economic loss under either negli-
1. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motor Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel Stnct Liability to the Consumer, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1122-
24 (1960).
2. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897,901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
3. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 1120; see also Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,
19, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965) (commercial consumer was held to have
adequate remedies under the U.C.C.).
4. McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967) (the basic
theory of McCormick is embodied in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
5. See Noel Transfer & Package Delivery Serv., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 341 F.
Supp. 968 (D. Minn. 1972); Peterson v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 296 Minn. 438, 209
N.W.2d 922 (1973).
6. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25, 27-
33 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Miehle Co. v. Smith-Brooks Printing Co., 303 F. Supp. 501, 503 (D.
Colo. 1969); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976); Beauchamp
v. Wilson, 21 Ariz. App. 14, 515 P.2d 41 (1973); Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 135
Ga. App. 293, 217 S.E.2d 602 (1975); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326,
581 P.2d 784 (1978); Marcil v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 9 Mass. App. 908, 403
N.E.2d 430 (1980); Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 72 Ii. App. 2d 362,
219 N.E.2d 726 (1966); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d
643 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966); City of La
Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assoc., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976).
7. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). The Seely court considered
whether a plaintiff could recover the purchase price of a defective truck and the resulting
loss of profits for lack of its normal use. The court refused to allow recovery on the theory
of strict liability, stating that the law of sales was designed to meet the needs of parties
involved in commercial transactions. To allow other forms of recovery would undermine
the law of sales, and would not reflect the intent of the parties. In dicta, the court indi-
cated that economic losses could not be recovered under a negligence theory.
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gence or strict liability. Some states8 follow Santor v. A & M Karagheu-
sian,9 and allow commercial buyers to recover under either the U.C.C.
laws of warranty, or under a tort theory. The Minnesota Supreme Court
followed the majority rule in Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp. 1o
In Superwood, the plaintiff purchased a high capacity hot plate hard-
wood press in 1954 from the defendant, Siempelkamp Corp., a West Ger-
man corporation. The plaintiff operated the press from 1954 to 1975
without incident.II On March 24, 1976, the lubricating oil contained in
the main cylinder suddenly spurted through a rupture in the cylinder
wall irreparably damaging the hot plate press. 12 After the defendant's
inspection, the plaintiff disassembled the press and discovered that an
interior portion of this cylinder wall was substantially below stress and
safety specifications. The plaintiff contended that the weakened portion
of the cylinder wall was a dangerous defect causing the plaintiff substan-
tial loss. 1 3 On March 12, 1978, three years after the cylinder failed,
Superwood sued Siempelkamp in federal district court, for $616,716 in
damage to the press and lost profits. The plaintiff claimed negligence,
strict liability, breach of warranty, and breach of contract against the
defendant. 14
8. See Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Assoc., 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir.
1977) (applying South Dakota law); Sterner Aero AB v. Page Auto., Inc., 499 F.2d 709
(10th Cir. 1974) (applying Oklahoma law); Boone Valley Coop. Processing Assoc. v.
French Oil Mill Mach. Co., 383 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Iowa 1974); States Steamship Co. v.
Stone Manganese Marine Ltd., 371 F. Supp. 500 (D. N.J. 1973); Cova v. Harley Davidson
Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 609-11, 182 N.W.2d 800, 805 (1970); Berg v. General
Motors Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976); Lamphiear v. Skagit Corp., 6 Wash.
App. 350, 493 P.2d 1018 (1972);see also Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977)
(allowed recovery in strict liability for dangerously defective mobil home); Whitaker v.
Farmhand, Inc., 173 Mont. 345, 567 P.2d 916 (1977) (allowed recovery in negligence,
strict liability, and breach of warranty for loss of use of a ranch because of defective irriga-
tion equipment); Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281 Or. 587, 575 P.2d 1383 (1978) (involving
a defective truck axel; the court, assuming there was danger to other persons or property,
allowed recovery of damages to the product itself).
9. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). Santor allowed a commercial plaintiff economic
recovery against the manufacturer under either strict products liability or under the
U.C.C.'s warranty provisions for a cosmetic defect in carpeting. In so holding, the court
decided that the U.C.C. did not provide the exclusive set of remedies for cases arising out
of commercial transactions. But see Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liabilit--With a Close
Look at section 402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REv. 439, 452 n.30 (1969) (a court that
applies § 402A without taking account of the Code is defaulting on its constitutional re-
sponsibility to respect the legislative will). See generally Rapson, Produdt Liability Under Par-
allel Doctrines- Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19
RUTGERS L. REV. 692, 704-11 (1965) (pointing out several areas of inconsistency between
the code and strict liability tort theory).
10. 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981).
11. Id. at 160.
12. See Appellant's Brief at 3.
13. Id
14. See Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 160.
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The federal court granted the defendant a partial summary, judgment
dismissing the breach of warranty and contract claims. The statute of
limitations had expired on those claims. After considering whether re-
covery was available to commercial plaintiffs for pure economic losses
under strict liability and negligence theories, the federal court concluded
that Minnesota law was unclear on this question and therefore certified
three questions to the Minnesota Supreme Court in order to clarify the
applicable state law.15
1. Is the manufacturer of defective equipment (a press) strictly lia-
ble in negligence to the user of the equipment damaged in its
property and business by negligent product manufacture, in-
spection, installation, or supervision?
2. Is the manufacturer of defective equipment (a press) strictly lia-
ble in tort to the user of the equipment damaged in its property
and business by the product defect?
3. If question 1 or 2, or both, are answered affirmatively, are any
• . . [economic] damages recoverable, if directly caused by negli-
gence or defect?16
The Minnesota Supreme Court framed the issue as whether economic
losses arising out of commercial transactions are recoverable under negli-
gence and strict products liability theories.17 If neither negligence nor
strict products liability theories applied to commercial transactions, the
question of damages would be moot.18
Many courts have considered whether negligence and strict products
liability theories apply to commercial transactions.19 Those courts
clearly divide into majority and minority camps. The first and leading
minority case is Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 20 while the leading
majority case is Seely v. White Motor Co. 21
In Santor, the plaintiff bought grade # 1 carpet from a store.22 After
15. Id
16. Id
17. Id. at 160-61. The RESTATEMENT gives the most famous strict products liability
rule: "One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
use or consumer or to his property, is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A(l) (1965).
Minnesota adopted the RESTATEMENT version of strict products liability in McCor-
mack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967); see also Steenson, The
Anatomy of Product Liability in Minnesota." Princip les of Loss Allocation, 6 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 243, 251-56 (1980) (a brief history of products liability in Minnesota).
18. See Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 162.
19. Id. at 161; see also, Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403
P.2d 145 (1965) (majority); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965) (minority); cases cited supra notes 6 & 8.
20. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); see infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
21. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); see infra notes 26-31 and
accompanying text.
22. See Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
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the carpet was laid, the plaintiff noticed an unusual line in it. Though
the defendant manufacturer assured the plaintiff the line would wear
away, it never did. In fact, two additional lines appeared. 23 The New
Jersey court allowed the plaintiff to sue the manufacturer under strict
products liability or the U.C.C. warranties.24 For the New Jersey court,
the U.C.C. warranties were not exclusive remedies.25
In Sedy, the plaintiff purchased a truck from a dealer. 26 The truck
repeatedly malfunctioned. Eventually the brakes failed while rounding a
corner. The truck flipped and crashed. 27 The plaintiff sued the truck's
manufacturer for the purchase price of the defective truck and lost profits
because he could not make normal use of the truck. 28 The California
court would not apply strict liability to the manufacturer in a commer-
cial transaction. The U.C.C. governs the economic relations between
manufacturers and consumers; strict liability governs the distinct prob-
lem of physical injuries from defective products. 29 The truck did not
meet warranty specifications, however, and therefore, the manufacturer
was liable for damage to the truck and lost profits. 30 Under strict prod-
ucts liability or negligence, the defendant would not be liable for such
economic losses.31
Although the Minnesota court had never before faced the issue of
whether economic loss in a commercial setting is recoverable under negli-
gence and strict products liability theories, the court previously had ap-
proved of the Seely holding in Farr v. Armstrong Rubber. 32 In Farr, the
plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a defective tire.33 When it applied
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, the court noted that strict
products liability did not undermine the U.C.C. warranties. 34 The Farr
court approved of Seely because "[t]he laws of warranty still meet the
needs of commercial transactions and function well in the commercial
setting."35 Tacitly, Seely was already law in Minnesota.
The Superwood court continued its analysis by noting the U.C.C.'s legis-
lative history. When the Minnesota Legislature adopted the U.C.C. it
23. Id at 56, 207 A.2d at 307.
24. Id at 57 & 63, 207 A.2d at 310 & 312.
25. Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 161.
26. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 12, 403 P.2d 145, 147, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 19 (1965).
27. Id
28. Id at 13, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20. The plaintiff also asked for the cost
of repairing the damaged truck. Id at 13, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
29. Id at 14, 403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
30. Id at 16, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22. The warranty stated the truck was
"free from defects in material and workmanship under normal use and service." Id
31. Id at 17, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
32. 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970).
33. See id at 87, 179 N.W.2d at 67.
34. Id. at 89, 179 N.W.2d at 70.
35. Id at 94, 179 N.W.2d at 71.
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intended to clarify the rights and remedies of parties to commercial
transactions. 36 For example, the U.C.C. provided warranties,3 7 warranty
disclaimers,38 liability limitations,39 and notice provisions.40 The Minne-
sota court feared allowing tort theories of recovery in commercial trans-
actions would blur the rights and remedies of commercial parties that the
U.C.C. was intended to clarify. Allowing tort liability would permit par-
ties to circumvent and thereby weaken the effectiveness of the U.C.C.
The legislature intended that the U.C.C. exclusively encompass a party's
rights in commercial transactions. The majority ruled that the U.C.C.'s
effectiveness would be preserved only if recovery of economic loss was not
available under negligence and strict liability in commercial
transactions.41
The Superwood holding does not prevent consumers from suing a man-
ufacturer under strict products liability.42 For instance, a Delaware case,
Cline v. Prowler Industries, Inc., 43 held that the U.C.C. completely pre-
empted the entire products liability field, leaving injured consumers with
only the remedies provided in the U.C.C. 4 4 The Superwood court did not
agree. 45 Strict product liability developed because sales law did not ade-
quately protect consumers. 46 Strict products liability and negligence ac-
tions best meet the needs of consumers, while the U.C.C. best meets the
needs of the commercial sector.4 7 The U.C.C. exclusively governs com-
mercial transactions leaving no room for strict products liability and neg-
ligence for economic losses in a commercial setting. Only recovery of
property damage or personal injury remains outside of the U.C.C.'s pre-
view. Superwood Corporation could not recover under either strict lia-
bility or negligence.48
Justice Yetka agreed with the majority in disallowing recovery by a
commercial plaintiff for purely economic losses under strict liability, but
argued that a commercial plaintiff should be allowed to assert negligence
as a ground for recovery of economic injury.49 He argued that the legis-
lature did not intend to abrogate negligence actions, and that allowing
36. See Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 162.
37. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-314 (1982).
38. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-316 (1982).
39. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-719 (1982).
40. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-607 (1982).
41. See Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 162.
42. Id
43. 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980).
44. See id. at 980.
45. See Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 162.
46. Id; see also Noel, Products Liability of Retailers and Manufacturers in Tennessee, 32
TENN. L. REV. 207 (1965); Prosser, supra note 1; Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defec-
tive Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965).
47. See Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 162.
48. Id
49. Id (Yetka, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 9
5
et al.: Products Liability—Recovery of Economic Loss in Commercial Transa
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1983
CASE NOTES
negligence actions would neither "emasculate" the U.C.C., or contra-
vene prudent policy. According to the Justice, Minnesota has long rec-
ognized negligence in commercial contexts. Statutes are not construed to
abrogate long-held common law rights unless the statute expressly so
states. Because the legislature did not expressly preempt negligence as a
theory of recovery for economic loss, it survives the enactment of the
U.C.C.5o
Justice Yetka saw no reason to think that negligence actions in com-
mercial cases would emasculate the U.C.C. The framers of the U.C.C.
never intended to exclude negligence actions.51 The U.C.C. warranty
theories supplement negligence theories.
52
Prudent public policy dictates, according to Justice Yetka, retention of
negligence actions for economic loss. Allowing damages for only per-
sonal and property damage allows a manufacturer to escape the full con-
sequences of marketing a defective product. Manufacturers will be more
accountable if held liable for all damages, economic and otherwise,
caused by their defective products. As a result, products will be safer for
all consumers.5
3
Two Minnesota cases have had an impact on the Superwood opinion.
In the first case, Allied Aviation Fueling Co. v. Dover Corp.,54 the court held
that the plaintiff did not prove the defendant's alleged negligence or
strict liability in attempting to recover economic loss,5 5 but the court did
not state that the plaintiff was precluded from asserting an action to re-
cover commercial losses under these tort theories. The plaintiff merely
failed to meet the burden of proof. Allied Aviation demonstrated a will-
ingness by the Minnesota Supreme Court to allow economic loss claims
to be brought under negligence, if not also strict liability.5 6
In the second case, Le Sueur Creamey Inc. v. Haskon,57 the Federal
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found "that property damage, includ-
50. See Superwoo, 311 N.W.2d at 163 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
51. Id Justice Yetka notes that, "U.C.C. 2-218, Comment 2, indicates that the ex-
pansion of existing warranties to the buyer's household and guests should be 'accom-
plish[ed] .. .without any derogation of any right or remedy resting on negligence.' " Id
(quoting U.C.C. § 2-218 comment 2 (1977)).
52. See Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 163.
53. Id The argument could, as well, justify strict product liability actions for eco-
nomic loss. Justice Yetka makes no mention of that possibility although he agrees that
commercial plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover for purely economic injuries under
strict liability. Id. at 162.
54. 287 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1980).
55. See id at 659. The Allied court held supplier of valve in a fuel system not liable
for economic loss sustained by a skilled user when valve supplied by defendant failed from
application of force during the use by user who has knowledge of the limitations of the
valve. Id.
56. Id
57. 660 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1981). In Le Sueur, a cheesemaker sued a dairy equipment
corporation and corporation's parent company for breach of warranty, negligence, and
1983]
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ing damage to the defective property itself. . . is recoverable in negli-
gence."58  The court held that lost profits for economic loss are
recoverable when property damage or personal injury also occur.59 If
property damage had also occurred in Superwood, the plaintiff would have
been allowed to assert a negligence action for the recovery of commercial
losses. o
In Superwood, the Minnesota Supreme Court clearly aligned itself with
the Seely majority. In a commercial transaction, strict products liability
and negligence actions are no longer allowed unless property damage or
personal injury occurs. The U.C.C. is the parties' only recourse and does
not allow recovery of economic loss. Thus, a plaintiff cannot recover for
economic loss in a commercial transaction in Minnesota.
misrepresentation with respect to the sale, installation, and servicing of the pasteurizing
equipment. Id
58. See id. at 349.
59. Id
60. But see Bland & Wattson, Propery Damage Caused by Defective Products, 9 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 1 (1984). Bland and Wattson claim that if the Superwood court had
followed Seely, the court would have based its decision on the unreasonably dangerous
defect in the press and would have allowed plaintiff to prove its case. They argue that
either the Minnesota Supreme Court did not follow Seely, or economic losses might never
be recoverable under Minnesota law. Id at 16-17.
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